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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Farmers5 outside-of-policy reference to "financial responsibility law" creates 
an ambiguity that must be resolved in favor of the insured Mr. Versaw. The sentence 
"financial responsibility law of the place of accident" must be construed to refer to the 
general law of the State of Utah, which recognizes that loss of consortium is a separate claim 
belonging to the spouse of an injured party. As a consequence, in accordance with the 
policy's step-up clause, Mr. Versaw is entitled to separate policy limits for each of the claims 
of Mrs. Viera, the injured spouse, and of Mr. Viera for his loss of consortium. 
ARGUMENT 
FARMERS' USE OF "FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY LAW" AS AN UNDEFINED 
TERM IN THE POLICY CREATES AN UNRESOLVABLE AMBIGUITY 
This case focuses on the ambiguity in this "step-up" clause of the policy: 
If the financial responsibility law of the place of the accident 
treats the loss of consortium as a separate claim, financial 
responsibility limits will be furnished. 
(R.28, Farmers Insurance Exchange policy, "Limits of Liability", at page 6). 
Farmers has conceded that lost consortium is a separate and distinct claim in 
Utah. "Farmers agrees with Appellants, that Utah's loss of consortium statute makes plain 
that ones spouse's loss of consortium claim is separate and distinct from the other spouse's 
bodily injury claim. The loss of consortium claim is a direct claim available to the non-
injured spouse." Appellee's Brief, page 4. 
Farmers further concedes that the "policy of automobile liability insurance 
issued to Mr. Versaw must insure him against loss from liability imposed by law, including 
liability pursuant to Utah's loss of consortium statute." Id. 
1 
Lastly, Farmers has conceded the following about the step-up clause which 
cuts to the core of this dispute: 
It should be noted that the reference to "the financial 
responsibility law" in the "Limits of Liability" portion of the 
Farmers policy quoted above, potentially broadens coverage 
to Mr. Versaw if Utah does, in fact, in its Financial 
Responsibility law1 require separate limits for bodily injury 
and loss of consortium. 
Appellee Brief, Page 7. 
And thus is the dispute. 
The step-up clause at issue is sandwiched between two other paragraphs in the 
"Limits of Liability" section, as quoted in Mr. Versaw's opening brief: 
Limits of Liability 
* * * * 
The bodily injury liability limit for "each person" is the 
maximum for bodily injury sustained by one person in any 
occurrence. Any claim for loss of consortium of injury to the 
relationship arising from this injury will be included in this 
limit. 
If the financial responsibility law of the place of the accident 
treats the loss of consortium as a separate claim, financial 
responsibility limits will be furnished. 
We will provide insurance for an insured person, other than 
you or a family member, up to the limits of Utah's Financial 
Responsibility Law only of $25,000 per person, $50,000 per 
occurrence for bodily injury.... 
Farmers' policy, page 6 [under lineated emphasis added]. 
1 It is noteworthy that Farmers regularly capitalizes "Financial Responsibility Law" in 
its brief even though the relevant step-up clause of the policy does not do so. 
2 
The third paragraph above is known in the insurance industry as a "step-down 
clause" since it attempts to reduce automobile liability coverage for permissive non-family 
users. See Cullum v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 857 P.2d 922 (Utah 1993). Consonantly, 
the second paragraph quoted above is a "step-up clause" since it increases liability coverage 
for lost consortium claims when "the financial responsibility law" treats lost consortium "as a 
separate claim." Dodging the effect of this step-up clause and its inherent ambiguity, 
Farmers zeroes in on the first paragraph above which, absent the step-up clause, would 
arguably combine a claim of lost consortium within the limits for bodily injury to the spouse. 
A comparison of the step-up and step-down clauses in Farmers' Policy is 
instructive. First, in the step-up clause the phrase "financial responsibility law" is not 
capitalized, while in the step-down clause it is. Additionally, the step-down clause (in this 
particular policy) clarifies coverage by specifying exact limits, something a prior version did 
not do. See Cullum, 857 P.2d at 923; cf. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co. v. Dalgleish, 2002 
UT 59,52 P.3d 1142,1146. In this case, the step-up clause has no coverage clarification for 
"financial responsibility law." Regardless, both the step-up and step-down clauses 
ambiguously refer to an undefined body of law not found within the policy. 
Farmers' use of the term "financial responsibility law" already has been the 
subject of dispute before this Court. See Cullum v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 857 P.2d 
2 Also note that the uncapitalized and pluralized phrase "financial responsibility laws" 
appears in the Limits of Liability section of Coverage C-l, Underinsured Motorist 
Coverage, page 9, paragraph 3. (R.28, attached as Addendum A to Versaw Brief). In that 
section, the underinsured "financial responsibility limits" purport to be $10,000 per 
person, $20,000 per occurrence for lost consortium claims. 
3 
•J 
922 (1993). In Cullum, this Court determined that Farmers' reference to "the limits of the 
Financial Responsibility Law" violated Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-106 which prohibits the 
incorporation of provisions not appearing witliin the insurance contract. Mr. Versaw submits 
that Cullum is dispositive of the issues now before the Court, since that case illustrates the 
ambiguity of a clause that attempts to incorporate an otherwise undefined body of "financial 
responsibility law" which increases the vague "financial responsibility limits" that will be 
conditionally provided. 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-106(1 )(1996) prohibits insurers from crafting this 
type of ambiguity. The statute provides: 
[A]n insurance policy may not contain any agreement or 
incorporate any provision not fully set forth in the policy or in 
an application or other document attached to and made a part 
of the policy at the time of its delivery, unless the policy, 
application, or agreement accurately reflects the terms of the 
incorporated agreement, provision, or attached document. 
[Emphasis added]. 
As in Cullum, Farmers' continued reference to an uncapitalized and undefined 
"financial responsibility law" ambiguously incorporates statutory terms outside the body of 
the policy, in violation of §31 A-21 -106( 1). The holding of Cullum is equally relevant to the 
ambiguous step-up clause before the Court: 
Defendant's policy purports to limit coverage provided to 
permissive users but does not identify the limits. Rather, it 
refers to an undefined "Financial Responsibility Law." Thus, 
the policy incorporates coverage limits from an outside source 
3 The exact language of the step-down clause at issue in Cullum reads, "We will provide 
insurance for an insured person, other than you or a family member, up to the limits of the 
Financial Responsibility Law only." Even though capitalized, this Court found the 
clause to include an improper incorporation by reference. 
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without fully setting them forth in the contract. This violates 
the plain language and purpose of section 31A-21-106. 
Defendant presents a number of arguments as to why section 
31A-21-106 should not apply, none of which is persuasive. 
First, defendant argues that the statute prohibits only 
incorporation of other documents, not statutes. The language 
of the statute does not lend itself to such an interpretation, 
however, and defendant has not cited any authority supporting 
its argument. . . . 
* * * * 
Moreover, allowing an exception for incorporation of 
statutory provisions would frustrate the purpose of Section 
31A-21-106. Its aim is to ensure that the entire insurance 
contract is contained in one document so that the insured can 
determine from the policy exactly what coverage he or she 
has. . . . 
* * * * 
This case presents an excellent example of the foregoing 
problem, for an owner insured under defendant's policy 
cannot determine his or her coverage solely by relying on the 
document. An important element—the amount of coverage 
provided for permissive users—is not disclosed. In fact, the 
insured would have great difficulty discovering exactly what 
coverage this policy provides. The policy does not specify the 
law to which it refers. Even if an insured figures out that the 
provision refers to a Utah law, he or she would have difficulty 
finding the coverage limits. "Financial Responsibility Law" 
is not listed in the most recent index to Utah Code Annotated; 
there is a listing for "Financial Responsibility Provisions— 
Motor Vehicles," but it refers to sections 41-12a-101 to-606, 
which do not contain the minimum coverage limits. Rather, 
one would have to find section 41-12a-103(9)(a) or (b), which 
defines "owner's security" as, inter alia, an insurance policy 
or surety bond "conforming to Section 31A-22-302." The 
next step would be to locate this last-referenced section, 
which provides that every insurance policy bought to satisfy 
the security requirements must include "motor vehicle 
liability coverage under Sections 31A-22-303 and 31A-22-
304." Assuming the insured is still on the trail at this point, 
he or she would then have to find section 31A-22-304, which 
sets forth the limits. 
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857P.2d at 925. 
There is no difference between the rigmarole illustrated by this Court in 
Cullum, and the rigmarole heaped upon Farmers' insured Mr. Versaw trying to figure out the 
"financial responsibility law" of this or any other state, as improperly referenced in the step-
up clause. The ambiguous reference to "financial responsibility law" places Farmers' boat in 
the Straits of Messina, caught between the Scylla and Charybdis. If indeed—as argued by 
Farmers—the words "financial responsibility law" refer to a specific statute, this starboard 
reference violates §31 A-21-106, as per Cullum. On the portside, if "financial responsibility 
law" instead refers to the general law of the place of accident, then the step-up clause affords 
separate liability coverage for the separate loss of consortium claim brought by Mr. Viera. 
The cases cited by Farmers are of no import. None addresses the issue of 
ambiguity caused by improper incorporation of terms outside the policy. Only two of 
Fanners' cases actually deal with a policy containing a step-up clause. See e.g. Nollen v. 
Reynolds, 962 P.2d 633, 634 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998). However, the analysis by the New 
Mexico Court of Appeals is not consistent with this Court's analysis in Cullum: 
Given the holding [Gonzales v. Allstate Insurance Company, 
921 P.2d 944 (N.M. 1996)], whatever viable dispute remains 
in this case must center on language different from that in the 
insurance policy in Gonzales. There is one such difference. 
The third sentence of Paragraph 1 states: "If the financial 
responsibility law of the place of the accident treats the loss of 
consortium as a separate claim, financial responsibility limits 
will be furnished." This language was not present in 
Gonzales. Plaintiffs argue that under Romero v. Byers, 117 
N.M. 422, 426, 872 P.2d 840, 844(1994), loss of consortium 
is recognized as a separate claim belonging to the spouse in 
New Mexico, which entitles Richard to recover $25,000.00, 
the minimum coverage required by the financial responsibility 
law. Farmers, on the other hand, argues that it is necessary to 
look elsewhere than general court law in New Mexico. 
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Rather, Farmers maintains that under the explicit language of 
the policy we must examine the "financial responsibility law 
of the place of the accident" to see if that statute, and not just 
the general tort law, specifies loss of consortium as a separate 
claim. Of course, New Mexico's financial responsibility 
statute makes no reference to claims for loss of consortium. 
Because the financial responsibility statute does not separate 
loss of consortium from other types of claims, Farmers takes 
the position that no separate claim is allowed under the 
language of the insurance policy, and we agree. 
962 P.2d at 634-635, [emphasis added]. 
Likewise, the Fifth Appellate District of the California Court of Appeal in 
Mid-Century Insurance Co. v. Bash, 211 Cal. App. 3d 431, 259 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1989), 
concluded that the phrase "financial responsibility law" clearly referred to specific body of 
statutory law. This case, too, is inconsistent with Cullum. 
No other case cited by Farmers analyzed policy references to "financial 
responsibility laws." In fact, except for the two cases from California and New Mexico, no 
other case dealt with a policy that even had a step-up clause referencing "financial 
responsibility law." The issue is whether this Court, like the appellate courts of New Mexico 
and California, would make an insured search outside the policy for the financial 
responsibility law and the financial responsibility limits of the state of Utah, or whether the 
burden of policy disclosure rests with the insurer, as was required in Cullum. 
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CONCLUSION 
Respectfully, the Court should reverse the ruling in favor of Farmers 
Insurance Exchange, and remand this case for entry of judgment in favor of the appellants 
Versaw and Vieras, concluding that Mr. Versaw is entitled to be indemnified by Farmers for 
up to $60,000 coverage under the Farmers policy, $30,000 per person for each of Mr. and 
Mrs. Viera. 
DATED this 5th day of May, 2003. 
H. Michael Drake 
Attorney for Appellant Don Versaw 
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